The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed.
(V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow: Progress Publishers, Vol. 33, pp. 109-11, cited in Roy Medvedev, The October Revolution, London: Constable, 1979, p. 186) The Sandinista revolution of 1979 transformed the polity and economy of Nicaragua. Dictatorship was replaced by a more democratic and participatory political system and the 'repressive agro-export model' of development of the previous three decades ( Barraclough, 1982) was replaced by a model based on socialist principles. No one concerned with justice, equality or the alleviation of poverty should weep over the passing of the Somoza regime. The Nicaraguan version of an agroexport model of development resulted in peasants being forced off the land and an increasing proportion of the cultivated area being held by large estates. The process of polarization went so far that by 1970 it is estimated that the poorest 50 per cent of the population consumed less than 1800 calories per capita per day. Growth did indeed occur, at least between 1950 and the early 1970s, and rates of investment were in general quite high, but the growth that occurred was accompanied by impoverishment and increased inequality.
The crisis of the repressive agro-export model was precipitated not by the impoverishment of the peasantry and an intolerable increase in inequality but by a decline of the economy into a depression in the early 1970s and a sharp fall in average incomes. 1 This produced conflicts within the propertied class and made it possible to form an alliance among disaffected groups of the property owning class, intellectuals and other members of the urban elite and a majority of the urban and rural poor. This alliance eventually was able to destroy the Somoza regime and to do so with relatively little difficulty as compared to the long and violent struggles that took place, e.g., in Algeria, Vietnam, Angola and Mozambique.
The Sandinista government that followed the revolution expropriated the properties of the Somoza group and its allies and as a result by 1980 the state owned the entire banking system, half the agroprocessing facilities, one-third of manufacturing capacity, one-fifth of the cultivated land and all of the construction, mass transport, fishing and forestry industries. In addition, foreign assets in mining and bananas were nationalized and compensation agreed with the previous owners. These changes in ownership meant that the state acquired direct responsibility for enterprises accounting for about 40 per cent of GDP (FitzGerald, 1988: 19) . That is, the state clearly owned and controlled the commanding heights of the economy and was well poised to launch a socialist strategy of development.
Centralized planning was introduced; multiple exchange rates were adopted; the nationalized banking system was used to guide credit to projects and sectors of high priority; foreign exchange resources were allocated centrally. Other controls were used to regulate the private sector. Thus if socialism is equated with planning and public ownership of the most important means of production, Nicaragua became a socialist country. The government, however, always said that its intention was to create a mixed economy.
Looking back on the early years of post-revolution Nicaragua, it is evident that the Sandinista government intended to use state power to achieve two major objectives. The first was to reallocate resources towards the poor, largely in the form of state provided services. There was a considerable expansion of health, education, nutrition and literacy programmes. Attempts were made to foster popular organizations (although they functioned poorly) and some effort was made to liberate women and, later, meet the specific demands of the minority Indian populations. The 'basic needs' component of economic policy certainly led to an initial improvement in the living conditions of the poor although, as we shall see, the improvement would not be sustained.
